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RELATIONS OF FORCE AND





This paper argues that Aboriginal rights are best
understood as the product of cross-cultural
interaction-not, as is usually supposed, the result of
some antecedent body of law (English, international, or
Aboriginal). Aboriginal rights are therefore
intercommunal in origin. The paper does describe the
process by which this body of law emerged, but its
primary vocation is theoretical, concerned with the
following questions: How can a normative community
emerge in the presence of profound cultural divisions?
How can relations of justice emerge in a context
dominated by power and coercion? How does moral
reasoning draw upon the factual relations of the past?
Does the process create law, cognizable by judges?
L'auteur affirme qu'il faut concevoir les droits
autochtones, non pas comme le produit des ragles
preexistantes du droit anglais, international, ou
autochtone, mais comme le r~sultat d'une interaction
interculturelle. Les droits autochotones seraient done
intercommunautaires dans leur essence m~me. Cet
article dcrit le processus par lequel ces droits ont pris
forme, mais son but principal est de nature th~orique.
II tente de rpondre aux questions suivantes: Comment
une communaut6 normative peut-elle 6merger en
prsence de divisions culturelles profondes? Comment
peuvent 6tre cr~es des relations de justice dans un
contexte domin6 par le pouvoir et la force? Comment
le raisonnement moral se d~finit-il par rapport aux
relations de fait? Ces processus d'exp6rimentation et
de rdflexion peuvent-ils etre source de droit pour le
juge?
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 24 July 1534, Jacques Cartier erected a wooden cross at the
entrance to Gasp6 harbour. The original meaning of the cross is
ambiguous. It undoubtedly marked the discovery of the territory on
behalf of the French Crown, it affirmed the discoverers' Christian faith,
and it served as a navigational aid to the harbour entrance. The cross
eventually became the symbol of much more, however. It came to be
seen as the material expression of all French claims to the lands of the
St. Lawrence basin.1 Over the years, it has become one of many images
at the centre of a debate over the rights of indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples-of colonizers and colonized-in northeastern
North America. For the successors to the colonists, it represents (in its
simplest interpretation) their right to sovereignty and to occupation of
the land, a right obtained by reason of discovery. For the Aboriginal
peoples, it is a symbol of the arrogance of the colonists, who claimed to
take possession of an entire continent by a small, unilateral ceremony, in
utter disregard for the complex societies that occupied and harvested the
products of the land.
This opposition reflects a larger disagreement over the nature
and origin of Aboriginal rights-by which I mean the set of special rights
that Aboriginal peoples are said to possess within Canadian law, not the
norms generated by and governing the internal affairs of Aboriginal
1 For ambiguity in the meaning of the cross, see B. Slattery, "Did France Claim Canada Upon
'Discovery?' in J.M. Bumsted, ed., Interpreting Canada's Past, vol. 1 (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1986) 2 at 7ff [hereinafter "Did France Claim Canada"]; M. Trudel, Histoire de la Nouvelle-
Franc vol. 1 (Montreal: Fides, 1963) at 81-82; and R. Cook, "Donnacona Discovers Europe:
Rereading Jacques Cartier's Voyages" in R. Cook, ed., The Voyages ofJacques Cartier (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993) ix at xxiii-xxv.
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communities 2 According to one common perspective, Canadian
sovereignty derives from an original taking of possession, similar to that
attributed to Cartier, which was completed by the colonists' later
occupation of the land. On this view, Aboriginal rights, if they exist at
all, are based entirely on the law that governed the colonial power at the
time of taking possession: that power's own internal legal system or the
international law of European states3 According to another
perspective, the persistence of Aboriginal sovereignty and territorial
rights derives from the impossibility that mere discovery could displace
Aboriginal institutions. On this view, Aboriginal rights find their source
in the Aboriginal societies themselves, prior to colonization, rights which
the actions of the colonizing powers have not extinguished.
4
These two approaches are based on fundamentally different
interpretations of the initial events. They are, however, surprisingly
alike in their theory of sources. Both trace the origin of Aboriginal
rights to positive rules existing independently of the relationship
between the parties. In both, Aboriginal rights find their source in and
derive their content from a set of norms existing before colonization,
either the law of the colonial power, the law of the Aboriginal people, or
the rules of international law. Events after contact are relevant only to
determine if, according to the requirements of those norms, certain
rights existed at the moment of contact and continue today. Events after
contact, in the territory called New France, are merely the raw material
for an analysis, the normative content of which was fixed before
colonization. Aboriginal rights result from the application of a pre-
existing body of law (application understood in its simplest sense), not
the emergence of norms through the occult processes of social
interaction.
2 The literature often confuses these two meanings of "Aboriginal rights." This confusion
flows from ambiguity concerning the source of the rights. If indigenous governmental or land rights
were founded exclusively on indigenous normativity, there would only be one meaning, without any
need to distinguish. But the protection of Aboriginal rights by Canadian law does not involve the
direct application of indigenous law. At the very least, the protection of Aboriginal rights requires
recognition within the Canadian legal order, and this in itself imports additional considerations.
Moreover, this article's principal thesis is that Aboriginal rights are not simply indigenous norms,
but the result of intercultural interaction.
3 See, for example, H. Brun, "Les droits des Indiens sur le territoire du Quebec" (1969) 10 C.
de D. 415; K. McNeil, Common Law.Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) at 176 and 193-243;
and L.C. Green, "Claims to Territory in Colonial America" in L.C. Green & O.P. Dickason, eds.,
The Law of Nations and the New World (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1989) 1.
4 See, for example, M. Asch & P. Macklem, "Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An
Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 498; and P. Macklem, "First Nations Self-
Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 382.
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This way of approaching the issue is undoubtedly popular, but it
is also wrong. It distorts the motives that underlie the evolution of
Aboriginal rights, motives that give those rights their normative force.
Do we recognize Aboriginal rights simply because our sense of justice is
offended by the violation of an obscure law of the seventeenth or
eighteenth century? The simplistic theory of sources outlined above is
incapable of capturing the content of judicial decisions on Aboriginal
rights. Would anyone pretend that those decisions truly apply the
positive law of the period before colonization? Would Champlain
himself recognize the rules that we now apply to his successors' actions?
This paper proposes a theory of the origin of Aboriginal rights
that better explains their development and content. It suggests that they
are the result of the interaction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
peoples, and the process of reflection on that experience, rather than the
positive law of one people. They constitute a set of norms that are
fundamentally intercommunal, created not by the dictation of one
society, but by the interaction of various societies through time.5
At the moment of their encounter, Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal societies possessed their own sets of norms, each created in
ignorance of the other. They constituted autonomous normative
universes, without a common justice and indeed without intercommunal
norms capable of regulating their relations with each other. The parties
could have acquiesced in this situation. They could have refused all
concessions to the other's sense of justice, settling their intercommunal
conflicts through the use of force, as indeed was done in some colonial
situations. 6 But for a whole host of motives, noble and ignoble, they
generally sought to live peacefully with each other, hammering out a
modus vivendi that became the foundation of a normative community
that crossed the cultural divide.
The internal norms of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
societies did influence this emergent normativity, but not in the straight-
5 For approaches that suggest a theory of sources similar to that presented here, see B.
Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 [hereinafter
"Understanding"]; J.G.A. Pocock, "Law, Sovereignty and History in a Divided Culture: The Case of
New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi" (Iredell Memorial Lecture, Lancaster University, 10
October 1991) [unpublished]; Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in
Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Canada
Communication Group, 1993) at 20 (Co-chairs R. Dussault & G. Erasmus) [hereinafter Partners in
Confederation]; and J. Webber, "The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of Justice
in Mabo" (1995) 17 Sydney L. Rev. 5 [hereinafter "Jurisprudence of Regret"].
6 Some explorers and colonists did use brute force in the region studied, especially at the
beginning of the period: see the examples cited infra notes 18 and 19. That was not the dominant
approach, however, once colonization was under way.
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forward, deductive fashion often supposed. The distinctive norms of
each society furnished the point of departure, determining the spirit of
interaction, colouring the first interpretations of the other's customs, and
shaping the beginnings of a common normative language. But the final
product was above all the result of mutual adaptation, in which the
structure of the relationship was formed as much from compromises on
the ground as from abstract principles of justice. It was the outcome of
trial and error, not the application of pre-existing rules.
This process created a new, cross-cultural community-one
which did not, however, displace its constituent societies. Its aspirations
were modest, restricted to intercommunal relations. The original
societies continued to deal with internal conflicts through the application
of their own standards (although in many cases these were modified by
exposure to other modes of social ordering). Thus, individuals became
members of at least two communities at the same time-their original
society, which continued to govern most of their relations, and, for a
much more limited set of questions, the community of all inhabitants,
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal.
This use of "community" may seem surprising. That term is
frequently restricted to highly cohesive groups whose members express a
strong sense of belonging, who share the same cultural values-perhaps
only those groups that serve as the principal focus of allegiance for their
members. Indeed, we often use "community" precisely in order to
emphasize the intensity of members' commitment to a group, and, in
that context, frequently fall prey to hyperbole. In this paper, I want to
avoid such simplistic and ultimately misleading definitions. I want to
retain the possibility of one member possessing multiple allegiances,
multiple memberships, belonging to multiple communities. These
possibilities should not be foreclosed by the very terms of the analysis. I
therefore employ a concept in which a community's substance, its shared
core, consists not in its members' adherence to a single set of beliefs or
values, but rather in their participation in a common discourse through
time. Such a discourse certainly has its own character, its distinctive
reference points, its unique dynamic. Participation implies that one
accepts, at least provisionally, the specific terms of that discourse, its
vernacular. But it does not require that members have identical values
or limit their involvement to a single discourse. This sense of community
is more flexible than many competing definitions, more tolerant of
internal disagreement and debate, more willing to recognize the
presence of multiple allegiances, while nevertheless capturing the
1995]
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distinctiveness-the sense of separateness and cohesion-of
communities.7
In the end, the cohesion of a community is a matter of degree.
The intensity of members' participation, the extent of commonality,
occurs along a spectrum ranging from very minimal sharing up to
virtually complete unity. In this paper I am concerned with the
emergence of a normative discourse crossing the Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal divide. The critical point for me is thus the moment when a
shared normative discourse first appears, even if that discourse is limited
and even if it fails to prevent conflict between the participants. Others
might confine the use of "community" to a higher level of integration. If
they would prefer to call the order discussed here a proto-community or
an emergent community, that suits me fine. My concern is simply that
the emergence of a shared normative discourse be taken to be a
significant development, that one admits that a single person might be a
member of more than one discourse at the same time (some discourses
being very rich, others more restrained), and that one does not fall back
upon an implicit, restrictive definition of community to presume that a
normative discourse must be single and exclusive.
I also use the term "community" even though the order
described here was not the product of the parties' unconstrained
consent, indeed even though it was shaped by relations of force and
domination. Human interaction never occurs in a perfect world, free
from the effects of social inequality, and this was especially true of the
period of colonization, marked as it was by warfare, the seizure of lands,
and the decimation of Aboriginal societies by disease. The
intercommunal norms inevitably reflected, to some degree, the relative
power of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal parties. They took shape
against a backdrop marked by force, and there continued to be periodic
eruptions of violence as one party sought to use its might to advantage.
But the relationship was not simply a war of all against all. Alongside
the violence-competing with it, displacing it, or at times simply
restraining its exercise-there emerged a series of principles recognized
by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies as normative. These
standards did not govern intercommunal relations in any complete or
perfect way. From time to time, the parties pushed them aside, bluntly
refusing to follow them. But they nevertheless furnished grounds for
judgment independent of brute force alone. They enabled the parties to
7 For a more detailed discussion of this notion of community, see J. Webber, Relmaginhig
Canada: Language, Culture, Community and the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press,. 1994) at 183-228.
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establish stable expectations regarding the other's conduct and provided
grounds for criticizing that conduct (at times with telling effect) when it
departed from the norms. Even if the standards were marked from the
very beginning by relations of power, they formed a discourse of
justification that possessed a measure of autonomy from those
relations.8
The role of force is generally neglected in the literature on so-
called "spontaneous" orders, indeed in the literature on legal pluralism
generally. This body of work tends to assume that the norms that result
from the autonomous interactions of individuals or that emerge within
non-state institutions are, in some ways, superior to those created by the
state. To recognize the role of power in private relations would, these
legal pluralists fear, undermine these assumptions given the common
myth that force is the implacable enemy of the just. It might even
undermine the spontaneous orders' claim to be normative. Often, then,
the pluralist literature minimizes or ignores the role of power. But this
too is unacceptable. Social orders are marked simultaneously by
relations of power and relations of justice. The challenge for the student
of social normativity is not to deny the role of power, but to understand
how standards can emerge from an interaction that is fundamentally
imperfect, and yet acquire normative force.
Recognizing the normative character of these standards does not
necessarily mean that we must submit to them. Standards of justice are
shaped by their context; sometimes that context is so reprehensible that
the norms based upon it deserve radical rejection. Rejection, however,
has its costs. The most important is the loss of the constraints and
stability flowing from respect for the standards, and the consequent need
to depend on force alone. Occasionally, such radical rejection is
justified. But much more often, perhaps always, we accept a degree of
tension between what we want to achieve and what is. We seek to
modify the way things are, exploiting the possibilities for evolution in the
existing law, but all the time relying upon-indeed often insisting
on-today's normative standards as a buffer against the unrestricted use
8 This article therefore rejects the tendency to deny the possibility of a negotiated normative
order in situations of domination. In those situations, the order may well be unequal and even
repugnant, yet still be normative in the sense that it is not simply the temporary expression of the
will of the more powerful party, but rather imposes standards that constrain that party. This article
thus joins the growing body of literature on the existence of negotiated orders in situations of
profound inequality, such as slavery or paternalism. See, for example, E.D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan,
Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage, 1972); M. Sobel, The World They Made
Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-century Virginia (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987); and, concerning Aboriginal peoples, R. White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires,
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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of force. After all, a measure of peace and stability always depends upon
the acceptance, at least provisional, of a normative order that is not the
result of our will alone.
This paper argues that Aboriginal rights are best understood as
the product of practical reason-a process of experimentation and
reflection that begins from the concrete reality of a lived relationship,
tries to understand its strengths and weaknesses, and derives from it
workable conceptions of justice.9 That process always takes place in a
specific context, drawing on the attitudes and experiences of the parties
involved. This paper therefore begins by describing the interaction
between colonists and Aboriginal peoples in northeastern North
America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, focusing
especially on the emergence of norms. It goes on to review the great
Aboriginal rights decisions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
demonstrating how they too support the view that Aboriginal rights are
the product of practical reason. Finally, it offers some general
reflections about the possibility of justice across cultures and about the
justiciability of Aboriginal rights before the oidinary courts.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF NORMATIVE COMMUNITY
BETWEEN COLONIZERS AND COLONIZED
The colonization of northeastern North America cannot be
understood as a clash between two actors, one Aboriginal, the other
European. The differences between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
societies were indeed profound, but important differences of interest
and culture also existed within each of those two great constellations.
These differences had a substantial impact on the pattern of cross-
cultural relations, often permitting, for example, the conclusion of
alliances across the cultural divide.
The colonial powers were far from united in their approach to
the continent. The colonies that were most influential in the St.
Lawrence Basin were established under the patronage of three
European states-France, England, and Holland. Even within the
English sphere there were often significant conflicts between colonies,
9 For other attempts to conceive of legal normativity as the result of this kind of practical
reason, see G. Postema, "On the Moral Presence of Our Past" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 1153; B.
Slattery, "Rights, Communities and Tradition" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 447; and "Jurisprudence of
Regret," supra note 5.
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and between colonial and imperial authorities. 10 England's American
colonies had their own governments, their own popular assemblies.
They embraced a range of ideological and economic aspirations which in
turn generated diverse Aboriginal policies. Within each colony there
were often profound differences over Aboriginal matters, especially
among fur traders, missionaries, and agricultural settlers. 11 Moreover,
colonial policy tended to evolve with the rhythm of settlement, in
particular the decline of the Aboriginal population from disease and
war, the increase in the numbers of colonists, and the transition from a
predominantly commercial economy to one based on agricultural
production. 12
The Aboriginal side presented a similar complexity. Aboriginal
peoples embraced a number of cultures and languages. There was
considerable variation in their ways of life. Agricultural production was
crucial to some peoples. Others did not farm, but gained their livelihood
exclusively from hunting and gathering, exchanging the products of the
hunt first with their indigenous neighbours and later with Europeans.
The size of Aboriginal communities was modest and, in the region
discussed here, their societies were characterized by a high degree of
individual equality and consensual decision making, contrasting
markedly with the hierarchical organization of contemporary European
states (although Europe's local representatives, the colonies, themselves
had small populations in which hierarchical discipline was often lax).
The modest size and consensual nature of Aboriginal societies produced
considerable autonomy of individuals and groups even within each
people. The patterns of exchange between Aboriginal peoples, their
geographical situation, and their military power generated complex
relations of cooperation, dependence, and hostility both among
themselves and with the colonists.
Given this context, the new interactions between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal peoples did not conform to a single, simple model. They
reflected, at least in their detail, the complexity of their surroundings.
10 See, for example, F. Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain
Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of
1744 (New York: Norton, 1984).
11 See, for example, B.G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age"
Reconsidered (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985) at 315-25 [hereinafter Natives and
Newcomers].
12 See, for example, the transitions that occurred in New England: N. Salisbury, Manitou and
Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
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But despite this variation, the Aboriginal policy of the colonies did tend
to follow a similar trajectory.
All of the colonies, with the possible exception of New
Netherlands, first claimed sovereignty over all the lands specified in their
charters and refused to recognize, at least expressly, indigenous rights to
the land. In some of the literature on Aboriginal rights this is presented
as though it resulted from the pre-existing law of the European powers,
but the very concept of positive law is problematic in this period.13
International law was then undergoing profound transformation. The
Catholic Church had lost its hegemony, eroding its claim to be the
privileged interpreter of natural law. The sources of international law,
always ambiguous, had become still more uncertain. 14 Most importantly,
the issues raised in the Americas were just as new for the doctors of
international law as they were for the subjects of that law, the colonial
powers themselves. International law was more a matter of
improvisation than the application of pre-existing rules. Of course, the
elaboration of those rules took place without Aboriginal participation
and in a manner that reflected Europeans' desire to ratify the facts of
settlement.
It is clear, however, that the colonial powers did claim that they
could acquire sovereignty over, and perhaps ownership of, land in North
American colonies by unilateral acts of state. This was manifest in their
conduct and in the founding documents of many colonies. The three
charters granted at the beginning of the seventeenth century to the
Company of London (the first authority entrusted with the colonization
of Virginia) apparently granted that company full ownership of all lands
in the colony, with an absolute right of alienation. The Mayflower
Compact of 1620, the first constitution of the Plymouth colony
concluded just before landfall, manifested that colony's claim to
sovereignty over the land and persons of indigenous peoples. The
13 See, for example, G. Stanley, "The First Indian 'Reserves' in Canada" (1951) 4 R. d'histoire
de l'Am6rique frangaise 179 at 209ff; Brun, supra note 3 at 428-30 and 440-41; and Green, supra
note 3. There is an interesting contradiction in these arguments. They say that one should judge
the law of the period on the basis of its own norms and not according to today's conception of
justice. But their very interpretive framework-their concept of law as a closed system, and the
clear separation of international from domestic law-involves notions that were not yet dominant
during the period of colonization. In other words, they invoke contemporary sources but use them
in a thoroughly modem fashion. For more nuanced discussions of the law of the time, see "Did
France Claim Canada," supra note 1; and B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian
Peoples, as Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of their Territories (Doctoral Thesis, Oxford
University, 1979) at 66-190 [hereinafter Land Rights].
14 O.P. Dickason, "Concepts of Sovereignty at the Time of First Contacts" in Green &
Dickason, supra note 3, 141 at 143-73 [hereinafter "Concepts of Sovereignty"].
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French charters of the seventeenth century similarly granted the land to
the colonization companies "en toute propri6t6.
15
European philosophers had no doubt that European states could
acquire sovereignty in this manner. They were much less agreed about
indigenous rights to land. At the beginning of the colonial period, the
most extreme authors denied non-Christians any right to governmental
autonomy or to land. Others argued that indigenous societies enjoyed
natural rights of ownership, although these might be subject to the right
of Europeans to cross those lands, to preach Christianity, and to
suppress customs that offended against the natural order. Later writers
began to distinguish between sedentary and migratory peoples, arguing
that the latter had insufficient presence on the land to be considered
owners. The lands of migratory peoples-even the hunting territories of
sedentary peoples-were vacuum domicilium, subject to unrestricted
appropriation by colonists. For some authors, distinctions between types
of land use had still more importance; the biblical command to render
the land fruitful was itself sufficient justification for seizing and
cultivating Aboriginal lands.
16
There is thus considerable evidence that, in the early stages of
colonization, the settlers did claim sovereignty and often ownership of
Aboriginal lands, with little regard for the presence of indigenous
peoples. This assertion was soon modified, however, as a result of the
colonists' experience in North America. Arguments for sovereignty and
ownership may well have been persuasive in the salons of Europe, but
they had much less currency in America. Arriving in the new continent,
the colonists encountered the power and autonomy of the Aboriginal
peoples. If the colonists wished to benefit from the riches of the
land-indeed if they wished to survive-they had to adapt to the
societies that controlled and occupied that land.
The colonists chose a conciliatory approach for several reasons,
the simplest being their sheer vulnerability. As late as 1663, the entire
non-Aboriginal population of New France was only about 3,000 people.
In 1627, it had been 107. By contrast, there were approximately 20,000
Hurons and 30,000 Iroquois before the epidemics of the 1630s, and these
15 See the summary of the colonization charters in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 5 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
at 575-80 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson]; W.S. Robinson, Indian Policy of Colonial Virginia (Doctoral
Thesis, University of Virginia, 1950) at 16; Salisbury, supra note 12 at 113; and Brun, supra note 3 at
428-30. Slattery suggests that even the original claims were ambiguous and cites contradictory
practices: see "Did France Claim Canada," supra note 1 at 66-190.
16 Green & Dickason, supra note 3. See especially the contribution of Dickason to that book,
on which this paragraph is based: "Concepts of Sovereignty," supra note 14.
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were only the strongest of the region's Aboriginal nations. Epidemics
killed about half the population, but the survivors would nevertheless
have been populous relative to the newcomers. It would have been
impossible for such a tiny number of colonists to govern the Aboriginal
nations by force, or indeed by any other means.1 7 They therefore
worked to maintain peaceful relations with their indigenous neighbours,
especially those who were their closest allies.
The colonists' diplomacy was sometimes unsuccessful. Acts of
violence were common as a result of attacks by hostile nations, disputes
with allies over the occupation of land by colonists, fraud in land
transactions, theft, drunkenness, the internal power struggles of
Aboriginal nations, and the misunderstandings endemic to relations
across cultures. All colonies were subject to such strife, including
Virginia, which was then the largest European settlement in North
America. In 1622, the Powhatan people massacred a quarter of
Virginia's 1,200 non-Aboriginal inhabitants. In 1644, 500 more were
killed.18 The Europeans' vulnerability was even greater in colonies like
New France because of the nature of the fur trade. There, a very small
white population was dispersed across a vast territory, in constant
contact with the indigenous population.
This sense of vulnerability was not confined to the colonists. The
latter too could deploy considerable force, especially on a local level,
because of their firearms and mobility along the coast. Economic
competition and war among Aboriginal peoples meant that the First
Nations were rarely united against the settlers. On the contrary, they
frequently sought the settlers' help in their own indigenous struggles.
Thus, Aboriginal peoples had their own reasons to secure peace with the
newcomers. This was strikingly evident in the relations between the
people of Stadacona and Jacques Cartier, at the very beginning of
colonization in the St. Lawrence region. The actions of the Stadaconans
demonstrated their persistent attempts to create a basis for co-
1 7 Natives and Newcomers, supra note 11 at 233-42 and 330; and M. Trudel, Histoire de la
Nouvelle-France, Le comptoir 1604-1627, vol. 2 (Montreal: Fides, 1966) at 405-34 and 437-40. The
limits to colonial power were clearly demonstrated by the actions of the authorities of New France
during the years 1653-1657, after the dispersion of the Huron Nation by the Iroquois. The Hurons
were one of the principal allies of the colony. After the Hurons' destruction, the colonists felt very
vulnerable and concluded a treaty of neutrality with their traditional enemies, the Iroquois. In
order to maintain this neutrality, the colony even refused to help the 600 Hurons that the Jesuits
had encouraged to relocate close to Quebec when the Iroquois continued to attack them. The
colony decided to change its policy only after the Iroquois massacred a group of Hurons that the
colony had encouraged to join the Iroquois. The killers were the Hurons' escort. See Natives and
Newcomers at 273-81.
.18 Robinson, supra note 15 at 49-54 and 67-74.
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operation, founded on reciprocity, even in the face of duplicity by
Cartier. During his first voyage, Cartier seized two sons of the chief and
took them to France. During his second, he seized the chief himself.
The Stadaconans nevertheless tried on many occasions, sometimes from
a position of weakness, sometimes from one of strength, to conclude an
alliance with Cartier and even to transform the kidnappings into a
reciprocal exchange of hostages. 19 They were unsuccessful, but their
attempt demonstrates both their willingness to cooperate and the way in
which this willingness prompted a search for stable norms of
cooperation.
The second reason for a conciliatory strategy was economic
interdependence. The fur trade was the raison d'etre of New France, and
its success was wholly dependent on the active participation of the
Aboriginal peoples. If the French had alienated their Aboriginal allies,
the latter would have sold their furs to the English, withheld them until
relations improved, or, in the worst case, withdrawn completely from the
trade. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the English colony
of Sagadahoc failed precisely because the Amerindians boycotted trade
with it in reaction to the behaviour of its residents. Plymouth also
suffered because of the intimidation practised by the settlers during the
first years of the colony.20 But the Aboriginal peoples too were firmly
committed to the fur trade. It was the principal reason that they
compromised to maintain the modus vivendi. The importance they
attached to it was starkly demonstrated by the actions of the Hurons in
the midst of the carnage wreaked by introduced diseases. A number of
Jesuit priests were living in the Huron villages during the epidemics.
The French authorities had insisted that the Hurons accept the
missionaries as a condition of the fur trade. Many Hurons believed that
sorcery by the priests was responsible for the frightening number of
deaths. Two general councils debated whether they should expel or
murder the Jesuits, yet in the end they let the Jesuits remain. A few
years later, during the severe Iroquois attacks that resulted in the
dispersion of the Hurons, the majority of the Hurons, who were not
Christian, became very unhappy with Jesuit interference in their nation's
affairs. One group killed a Jesuit donnd (a lay assistant to the Jesuits) in
19 B.G. Trigger, The Children ofAataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660 (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976) at 182-200 [hereinafter Children of Aataentsic]; and Cook,
supra note 1 at xxv-xxxix.
20 Salisbury, supra note 12 at 92-94 and 139-46. For the French, see O.P. Dickason, Canada's
First Nations:. A Histoy of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1993) at 166-67 [hereinafter Canada's First Nations]; and White, supra note 8.
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order to provoke a debate on the value of the French alliance. The
councils nevertheless decided to maintain the bond. Even during the
two most important crises of their nation's existence, then, the Hurons
refused to sacrifice the French trade.21
Trade was not just a commercial necessity. It was frequently
crucial to the provisioning of both colonists and Aboriginal peoples. The
parties exchanged not only furs and trade goods but also food, above all
Indian-grown corn. This was another source of interdependence. After
the massacre of 1622, for example, the Virginians began a war of
extermination against the Powhatans. As a result, the colony ran short
of supplies and eventually agreed to renew the peace 22
In all of this, competition between colonies played a very
important role. Some colonies discovered the value of good relations
precisely because they lost part of their commerce to their rivals. The
Aboriginal peoples were fully capable of exploiting the manoeuvring
room created by colonial competition in order to maintain their
independence and the value of their product. Indeed, Amerindian
alliances were often critical for grander reasons of non-Aboriginal
strategy, spelling the difference between success and failure in
intercolonial wars.23
The value that the colonies attached to good relations differed
according to the nature of the colony, its stage of development, and even
the specific pattern of interests it contained. Fur traders naturally
tended to be the most sensitive to Aboriginal affairs. The intensity of
their interaction with Aboriginal peoples often generated a high level of
mutual understanding and respect. 2 4 Missionaries also manifested
considerable solicitude toward Aboriginal peoples, although this was
tempered by their desire to convert them to Christianity. Agricultural
settlers, on the other hand, had much less affinity with Amerindians.
2 1 Natives and Newcomers, supra note 11 at 246-65; and Children ofAataentsic, supra note 19 at
534-46. For the nature of donns, see Natives and Newcomers at 252; and Children of Aataentsic at
575-76. Trigger notes that the commercial advantages that the French extended to Christians were
responsible for many conversions among the Hurons: Natives and Newcomers at 254ff; and Children
ofAataentsic at 546-50. For the interdependence of the Iroquois and the Dutch, see Jennings, supra
note 10 at 47-52.
22 Robinson, supra note 15 at 49ff.
23 J. Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and an Analysis of the Royal
Proclamation of 7 October1763 (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs, 1981) at 29-237; and White,
supra note 8 at 142ff.
24 This phenomenon facilitated alliances across cultural lines, but sometimes also created
deep divisions within colonies. See, for example, French opinions on sexual relations between
Amerindians and colonists discussed in White, supra note 8 at 60ff.
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They commonly had few amicable contacts with Aboriginal peoples and
economic interdependence, if it existed at all, would generally have been
indirect, with little opportunity for discussion and exchange. Moreover,
the extension of agricultural settlement inevitably resulted in bitter
clashes over land, as colonial farming displaced Aboriginal uses.
The balance of these divergent interests had an appreciable
effect upon Aboriginal policy in the different colonies. The approach of
the predominantly agricultural colonies of Virginia or New England, for
example, was less flexible than that of New York or New France, in
which the fur trade played a greater role. The representatives of the
former often complained that the officials in Albany were too
conciliatory towards the Iroquois.25 However, during the first century
and a half of colonization, this was more a difference of nuance than of
kind. Even Virginia and the New England colonies sought a modus
vivendi with their Aboriginal neighbours. 26 For its part, New France was
fortunate to enjoy acceptable relations with its Amerindian allies even
during the period of agricultural settlement. The Aboriginal inhabitants
of the St. Lawrence Valley had been dispersed, probably by the Iroquois,
before French settlers arrived,27 and indigenous warfare had kept the
valley depopulated. Consequently, French colonization did not displace
a sedentary, indigenous presence. In fact, the Algonquins and
Montagnais, who lived north of the St. Lawrence, appreciated the
protection offered by the French against the Iroquois.
These, then, were the considerations that moved the parties to
adopt a modus vivendi. They did not move all colonists equally. Some
did try to assert sovereignty over the Aboriginal peoples. But the results
demonstrated the limits to the colonists' power, their failures amply
revealing the emergence of a normativity that was truly intercommunal.
The following sections explore the creation of that normativity in two
specific contexts: the pursuit of justice in cases of intercommunal
murder, and the recognition of Aboriginal rights to the land.28
25 Robinson, supra note 15 at 122-217.
2 6 IbiL See also Salisbury, supra note 12.
2 7 Natives and Newcomers, supra note 11 at 144-48.
28 There are obviously other illustrations. Familial relations across the cultural divide
represent a particularly interesting case: see J.S.H. Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company
Families in Indian Country (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980),
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III. EXAMPLES OF INTERCOMMUNAL NORMS
A. Responses to Murder
Even in the absence of war, murder was a common event
between Aboriginal peoples and colonists. There were many causes.
Some murders were prompted by the usual sordid reasons: theft,
jealousy, racial hatred, or vengeance for a real or imagined injury. There
were political assassinations, committed in order to maintain a
commercial monopoly, to prevent the encroachments of settlers, or to
obtain an advantage in the internal politics of an Aboriginal society.
In their own societies, Aboriginal people and Europeans
responded to murders in quite different ways. For Europeans, murder
was a matter of individual responsibility. When a murder was
committed, the authorities sought to identify, try, and execute the
culprit. For the indigenous peoples of northeastern North America,
murder was a matter between groups. When a killing occurred, the
relatives of the victim sought vengeance from the murderer's family.
Their simplest recourse was to kill the murderer or one of his kin, but in
the case of conflicts among members of the same or allied peoples, a
compensatory solution was usually substituted-either the gift of a slave
to replace the deceased or compensation in goods. As Richard White
rightly notes, the two normative universes were therefore directly
opposed in the solutions they suggested to intercultural violence. In
crimes between allied peoples, the French wanted to identify the
murderer and kill him, but they were profoundly shocked when their
Aboriginal allies killed prisoners of war. For the Aboriginal peoples, the
execution of enemies in war was simply legitimate vengeance. What they
found incomprehensible was the willingness of the French to kill
members of their own nation!29 The two viewpoints were fundamentally
opposed on a question that could threaten the very survival of any
alliance. What to do?
In New France this question was posed very early in the history
of the colony. In the spring of 1617, two Montagnais killed two
Frenchmen because the latter had beaten a Montagnais. The discovery
of the corpses in the autumn of 1617 provoked a crisis between the
French and their principal trading partner when the French banned the
Montagnais from entering the Habitation. A Montagnais chief began
negotiations with the acting commandant of Quebec, le sieur
29 Children ofAataentsic, supra note 19 at 59-61; and White, supra note 8 at 76-77 and 80.
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Beauchesne, by presenting him with a number of pelts to cover the
infraction. The commandant wanted to accept the compromise but two
Ricollet priests, Joseph Le Caron and Paul Huet, objected to the sale of
"la vie [et] le sang des Chrestiens pour des pelleteries."30 At French
insistence and in order to maintain the alliance, the Montagnais
surrendered one of the two murderers and two additional hostages to re-
establish good relations until Champlain should return from France.
Upon his return Champlain wanted to punish the murderers according
to French law, but the old master trader Grav6-du-Pont persuaded him
to accept the Montagnais compromise. Champlain remained
unsatisfied, however, and in 1622 he insisted that the murderer be
expelled from an official ceremony. After the intervention of another
principal trader, Guillaume de Caen, the question was finally settled by
the public confession of the accused and his accomplice. 31
Champlain consistently resisted the kind of concessions
championed by the fur traders. Again in 1628, after a second murder of
two Frenchmen, Champlain imprisoned the Montagnais murderer,
although he eventually freed him without confession or punishment in
1629. He insisted on the absolute sovereignty of France and the need to
enforce French law, even among the Amerindians. Champlain even
claimed the right to determine who would be chief among the
Montagnais, and believed (wrongly, according to Trigger) that the
Montagnais had submitted to his authority. His attitude put the alliance
in danger. In 1629, because of Champlain's interference, the
Montagnais helped the English capture Quebec (although the colony
was later returned). After Champlain's first years at Quebec, his
relations with the fur traders became increasingly strained. In 1619 the
traders' agents prevented him from embarking from France for Canada,
even though he was, at the time, Lieutenant to the Viceroy.32
Champlain's views on Aboriginal policy did not prevail. During his
mandate, he was forced to accept settlements dictated by the traders.
After his death, the conciliatory approach exemplified by the traders
became the dominant method for handling intercultural crime.
The colony's response to intercultural murder was not the result
of a sovereign act, but it nevertheless became the norm, regulating
30 Trudel, supra note 17 at 259.
31 Ibid. at 258-59 and 359-60; Natives and Newcomers,supra note 11 at 198-99 and 318; and
Canada's First Nations, supra note 20 at 165-66.
32 Natives and Newcomers, supra note 11 at 198-200 and 314-25. For a discussion of this
second murder, see Trudel, supra note 17 at 360. Trudel gives a much more positive evaluation of
Champlain's role.
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murder from Champlain's time until after the British conquest (at least
for Aboriginal peoples who retained a substantial degree of
independence). Its typical form was a mixture of French and Aboriginal
justice: the Aboriginal community identified and surrendered the
culprits to the French authorities who then pardoned them, the whole
transaction accompanied by a ceremonial exchange of gifts. It was a
synthesis of individual responsibility practised by the French, and the
acts of compensation and reconciliation common among Aboriginal
peoples. It was not premised on equality. The French clearly assumed
the superior role. In these exchanges, the French Governor was
recognized as the "father" of the Amerindians, guaranteeing peace not
only between himself and his Aboriginal allies, but also among the
various Aboriginal parties to the alliance. Indeed, the French often
served as mediators in conflicts among their indigenous allies, providing
the gifts that were indispensable to all Aboriginal diplomacy.
Nonetheless, the superiority of the French was not expressed through
the traditional forms of European sovereignty. They exercised the
prerogatives of power through hybrid means, not the straightforward
application of French law.33
As with all customary norms, the procedures were confirmed by
continual repetition. White tells the fascinating story of the actions of
Daniel Greysolon Dulhut following the murder of two Frenchmen near
Lake Superior during the 1680s, a story that demonstrates clearly the
process of creation and reaffirmation of the intercommunal norm. After
the attack, Dulhut seized those responsible and submitted them to a
European trial at Michilimackinac. The murderers were condemned to
death. This was only the beginning of the story, however. A whole
series of negotiations then began, the representatives of different
Aboriginal groups attempting to provide acceptable compensation, the
French inhabitants of the region requesting Dulhut to show mercy, and
Dulhut himself trying to find a solution that he could propose to the
Aboriginal peoples without losing face and that they would accept.
Dulhut eventually decided to execute only two of the murderers, the
same number as the French deaths, and this he did, attempting to justify
his actions in terms adapted from the language of Aboriginal vengeance.
He freed the others. The different Aboriginal groups around
Michilimackinac then began the formal process of re-establishing
friendship following these latest deaths. Dulhut participated actively in
33 See especially White, supra note 8 at 75-93 and 203-06. The response of colonists and
Aboriginal'peoples to murder is one of White's central themes, constituting an index of the
existence of a "middle ground" between the cultures.
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these efforts, giving presents to the father of one of the executed
offenders. To Dulhut's knowledge, the father could well have been the
person responsible for the initial attack.34
White offers many other examples in which the accused were
pardoned outright. According to White, the instructions issued in 1754
by the Marquis Duquesne de Menneville, then Governor of New France,
to the Sieur de Pean, appropriately summarizes the practice of the
preceding century and a half: "He must manage to see that he obtains
the murderers, to whom he will grant pardon in the customary
manner."35 Sometimes, new governors did not understand the demands
of this implicit normativity and either refused or delayed the pardons.
Their actions only served to increase the number of murder attempts
and weaken the alliance, prompting them (or their successors) to return
to more conciliatory policies. Such neglect for the customary ways
occurred at the end of the 1740s, then again during the final years of
New France. White suggests that the hardening of French policy during
this last period contributed to France's ultimate defeat.36 The modus
vivendi was not unique to New France. Following the Conquest, the
British under General Jeffrey Amherst attempted to impose a high
degree of control on the Great Lakes region. Aboriginal resistance
soon persuaded them to adopt the more subtle methods of the French,
although this was persistently impaired by the violence of the settlers
then moving into the Ohio country.
7
The Aboriginal policy of New Netherlands evolved in a similar
fashion. From the colony's foundation in 1624, the instructions issued to
its governors authorized the punishment of Amerindians for crimes
committed against colonists. Under the third Governor, William Kieft,
colonial authorities laid seige to Aboriginal villages to force them to
surrender members accused of crimes against settlers. These actions
provoked violent reprisals from the Aboriginal population and many
settlers lost their lives. Eventually, at the request of the colonists, the
34Ibid. at 75-82. white, at 82, notes that the murders of two French donnes in the same region
during the same period were resolved by the traditional form of compensation, suggesting that the
French had learned that it was not worth insisting on their own justice.
3 5 Ibid. at 93. For other examples, see Natives and Newcomers, supra note 11 at 265 (in 1648,
the Jesuits accepted a large indemnity from the Hurons to cover the murder of a donni); and J.D.
Hurley, Children or Brethren: Aboriginal Rights in Colonial Iroquoia (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1985) at 78-79 (in 1708, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, then governor
of the colony, accepted a prisoner from the Onandagas to compensate for the death of a
Frenchman).
36 White, supra note 8 at 198ff and 223ff.
3 7 bid. at 248ff and 343ff; and Stagg, supra noie 23 at 248ff.
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Dutch government replaced Kieft with Peter Stuyvesant. Stuyvesant
adopted a strategy of alliance rather than domination. He did ask
Aboriginal communities to surrender their offenders voluntarily, but he
renounced punitive expeditions. After the conquest of New Netherlands
in 1664, the British continued in the same vein. That very year, they
signed a treaty with the Mohawks providing that the Mohawks and the
colonists would each be responsible for the punishment of their own
members in cases of intercommunal crime. The parties generally
respected this agreement, and attacks on British settlers were resolved
through the Mohawks' payment of compensation.38
These arrangements were common in situations where
Aboriginal peoples retained a high degree of political independence,
especially in the context of the fur trade. They were less common but
sometimes present at the frontier of agricultural colonization, where
Aboriginal autonomy and colonists' vulnerability occasionally produced
a rough equilibrium. Conciliatory strategies were, however, much less
stable in agricultural areas, where the conflict over land was intense and
economic interdependence less pronounced. Farmers could espouse an
option that was unacceptable to fur traders: the expulsion or
extermination of the Aboriginal population.3 9 This aggressive strategy
eventually predominated during the expansion of the United States.
Mutual fear, as opposed to economic interdependence, was a poor
foundation for normative community.
Compensation in goods or slaves, or the practice of procuring
the surrender of murderers only to pardon them, was not the colonists'
preferred response to intercommunal murder. They most wanted to
punish this crime according to French (or Dutch or British) law, and this
they did as Aboriginal political independence was eroded. In New
France, for example, colonial authorities sought to apply French law to
Aboriginal people who resided near their settlements, and above all to
those that had adopted, with French encouragement, a way of life
approaching that of the Europeans. In New York, the Amerindians of
38 A.W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1960).
39 Following the massacre of 1622, for example, the colonization company in Virginia opted
for a war of extermination. The Virginians committed atrocities incompatible with the recognition
of any normative order, such as the poisoning of an entire group of Amerindians invited to a
ceremony to celebrate, so they thought, the re-establishment of peace. The Virginians could not
maintain this extreme position, however, even after the massacre. They eventually accepted an
agreement with the Amerindians. See Robinson, supra note 15 at 54ff. This event also reminds us
that normative standards, albeit very limited, can exist even in war. Respect for ambassadors is the
most common example.
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Long Island were placed under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts at
the same time that Aboriginal groups further away from colonial
settlements retained their own control. In Virginia, there was a clear
distinction in juridical status between tributary and non-tributary
peoples.40
But even in these cases, colonial jurisdiction was exercised in
very distinct ways-ways that acknowledged the collective identity of
Aboriginal groups and that did not simply impose the colonists' law. In
New France, the French sought the consent of the Aboriginal population
to the application of the colonists' law. At Ie d'Orl6ans in 1664, for
example, an Algonquin raped the wife of a settler. The Aboriginal
representatives protested against the impending execution of the
offender, arguing that their people were unaware that rape was
punishable by death. A discussion was held between the French
Sovereign Council on the one hand and the Algonquin, Montagnais, and
Abenaki chiefs on the other, which resulted in the Montagnais and
Abenakis agreeing to be bound in future by French law regarding
murder and rape. At Louisbourg, the French authorities similarly
persuaded the Micmacs to accept the application of colonial regulations,
after priests complained that the Micmac chiefs had failed to punish
their own members. In British colonies, even when the colonial
authorities insisted that an offender be punished, the punishment was
frequently entrusted to the band's chief. When the colonists did assume
direct jurisdiction over the Aboriginal population, they often made
special allowances in judicial procedure. And, with very few exceptions,
all these forms of involvement were limited to cases of intercommunal
crime. Crimes that occurred among members of a single Aboriginal
nation were left to the customs of that nation. 41
The reasons for treating Aboriginal people differently were
numerous. In some colonies, the settlers themselves wanted to maintain
the separation between peoples. This was true, for example, of New
40 For New France, see Trudel, supra note 17 at 353ff; Canada's First Nations, supra note 20 at
166-67; and O.P. Dickason, "Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations,
1713-1760" (1976) 6 Hist. & Archmology 1 [hereinafter "Imperial Race Relations"]. For New York,
see Trelease, supra note 38 at 179-82 and 185-86. For Virginia, see Robinson, supra note 15 at 155-
61, 196-202, and 279ff.
41 Hurley, supra note 35 at 75-82; Canada's First Nations, supra note 20 at 166; "Imperial Race
Relations," supra note 40 at 121-22; H.M. Neatby, The Administration of Justice Under the Quebec
Act (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1937) at 311-12; Salisbury, supra note 12 at 186-
88; Robinson, supra note 15 at 196-202 and 279ff; and Trelease, supra note 38 at 186. See also the
1778 treaty between the United States and the Delawares, cited in Worcester v. State of Georgia, 8
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 at 549 (1832) [hereinafter Worcester].
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England, at least during the early years. It was less true of a colony like
Virginia, in which the residents wavered between segregation and
assimilation. In New France, the authorities clearly would have
preferred assimilation, but it was not up to them alone. The Aboriginal
peoples frequently maintained a high degree of cultural autonomy and
collective identity, even when they lived in close proximity to Europeans.
In such situations, compromise was unavoidable. 42
These, then, were the solutions adopted for intercommunal
murder. They were not universal, applied in all colonies and to all
murders. They were subject to variation, depending on the erosion or
integrity of indigenous structures, or the extent of economic
interdependence. Nevertheless, for similar situations, during a given
period, the solutions often became consolidated and standardized. They
were generally robust, although not invariable. And, except in situations
in which Amerindians had been completely assimilated, they were always
adapted to the collective specificity of Aboriginal peoples.
B. Land Rights
The history of land rights is simpler than that of murder, the
norms established more uniform.
The traditional consensus is that New France never recognized
Aboriginal title to land. This has some justification-French grants to
colonists purported to convey full ownership of the soil, and French
authorities, unlike the British, did not systematically purchase
Aboriginal title.43 But this thesis requires considerable qualification.
With the exception of New Netherlands, all colonies initially claimed
ownership of the land. It is only as a result of the physical presence of
the Aboriginal people, on the land that the colonists wanted to occupy,
that colonies other than New France began to purchase Aboriginal title.
New France avoided a similar outcome largely because it faced a
different situation. During the principal period of agricultural
colonization, French settlers did not have to displace an established,
sedentary, Aboriginal population. Cartier and Roberval had
encountered such a population, the St. Lawrence Iroquoians, during
their first attempts at colonization in the mid-sixteenth century. Indeed,
the clumsiness of their Aboriginal diplomacy, including their seizure of
42 Salisbury, supra note 12 at 110-40; and Robinson, supra note 15.
43 See the works cited at supra note 13; and "Concepts of Sovereignty," supra note 14 at 220-
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Aboriginal lands without the people's consent, had contributed to their
eventual failure. It may also have been responsible for the exclusion of
the French from the St. Lawrence above Tadoussac until the 1580s
4
But, by the end of the sixteenth century, the Aboriginal populations of
Stadacona and Hochelaga had been dispersed, leaving the land largely
unpopulated. Moreover, for a very long time following Champlain's
arrival, the French population increased very slowly, and the principal
economic activity of the colony, the fur trade, did not require that the
Europeans occupy large tracts of land. In these circumstances, formal
purchases were unnecessary.
More importantly, focusing only on agreements for the sale of
land ignores the broader nature of the French/Aboriginal relationship.
Ownership in today's sense of the term-absolute control over a specific
plot of land, conferring an exclusive right to exploit that plot in an
intensive manner-was both irrelevant to the prosecution of the fur
trade and inconsistent with Aboriginal peoples' relationship to the land.
The fur trade required access to a vast territory, especially the right to
travel across country subject to Aboriginal control. Rights to exploit a
given territory were therefore regulated by means of political and
commercial alliances. French officials certainly recognized, at least in
practice, the necessity for these. They frequently entered into formal
alliances with their Aboriginal partners. They sought the permission and
help of their allies for the voyages of missionaries and traders. Even if
there were no great treaties of sale, then, the French clearly
acknowledged that the Aboriginal peoples controlled access to the land
and that it was desirable to gain access to that territory by agreement,
not force.45
In other colonies, where the competition for land was much
more pronounced, formal sales were the norm. From the very beginning
of New Netherlands, for example, colonists purchased their land in order
to avoid war with the indigenous population. The British continued this
practice after they seized the colony and renamed it New York. The
practice was not universally followed, however.46 By the middle of the
eighteenth century, settlement had extended far beyond purchased
areas, generating severe conflict with the Aboriginal population.
4 4 Natives and Newcomers, supra note 11 at 133-35 and 302-03; and Partners in Confederation,
supra note 5 at 10-13.
4 5 Land Rights, supra note 13 at 66-94; "Concepts of Sovereignty," supra note 14 at 222-26; and
Partners in Confederation, supra note 5.
46 Trelease,supra note 38 at 193-99; and Hurley, supra note 35 at 95-100.
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The practice in upper New York was the most liberal of all the
British colonies because of both the fur trade with the Iroquois and the
Iroquois alliance against the French. But even in colonies that were less
conciliatory, the authorities quickly found that prudence required a
measure of respect for the Aboriginal presence. This was so even in
those colonies that initially claimed full ownership of the soil. In
Virginia, the colony's charters apparently granted title to the London
Company. The company was convinced of its rights and objected
strongly when an early Governor, George Yeardley, submitted a land
concession to Aboriginal approval. Similarly in New England, the
colonies' leaders had no doubt that they held good title. But in both
cases, the colonies soon began to purchase land in order to preserve
peace-as was said in Massachusetts, to avoid "the least scruple of
intrusion."'4 7 This practice responded to a very real danger: many
conflicts, including two major massacres in Virginia, resulted from
settlers' encroachment on Aboriginal territory.48
The colonists' hunger for land frequently outstripped purchases.
These infringements generated serious unrest, which in turn prompted
the colonial governments to restrain their people. In seventeenth
century Virginia, the colonial administration tried to regulate settlement
by reserving territory for the Aboriginal population, by insisting that
lands be purchased before they were occupied, and sometimes even by
forcibly removing colonists from lands that had not been sold.4 9
Colonial authorities also enacted provisions against fraud. In 1634,
Massachusetts required that all private purchases of Indian land receive
the approval of the General Court. Similarly in Virginia, from 1658 on,
land sales were subject to control by the courts. Further restrictions
were imposed in 1700 and 1705.5o
These measures did not quell the influx of settlers.
Encroachments and clashes continued. In a further effort to solve the
problem, the British colonies held several councils with their Aboriginal
counterparts. These conferences often occurred at Albany, New York,
at the request of the Iroquois. Several colonies participated, often
represented by their governors and other members of their colonial
councils. The negotiations resulted in policies similar to those already in
4 7 Salisbury, supra note 12 at 180-81.
48 bI. at 175ff; and Robinson, supra note 15 at 16-24, 49-54, 67-74, and 78ff.
49 Robinson, supra note 15 at 78ff.
50 1bid. at 81 and 144-50; and Salisbury, supra note 12 at 192-93.
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place in the individual colonies-Indian land would be purchased,
colonization restricted, and private purchases prohibited.51
These conferences assumed added urgency during the land rush
into the Kentucky and Ohio territories, which coincided with the renewal
of war against the French. This interference with Aboriginal lands
raised the level of intercommunal conflict at a time when the British
most needed their Indian allies. In 1756, the imperial authorities
established their own superintendents of Indian affairs, taking control of
matters that until then had been left to the individual colonial
governments-a centralization clearly designed to control illicit
settlement more effectively. In 1758, the territory west of the
Alleghenies was confirmed as Indian territory and the British took steps
to remove squatters (with very limited success). After the elimination of
the French threat with the conquest of Quebec in 1759, there was some
indication that the British might renege on their policy of conciliation
and cooperation. In the aftermath of the war with the French, General
Amherst made land grants and promoted the colonization of New
York's Mohawk valley. This provoked a strong reaction from the
Aboriginal population, which eventually led to Pontiac's War. Even
before that conflict however, the imperial authorities intervened to
encourage Amherst to re-establish the policy of conciliation.
It was against this backdrop that the Royal Proclamation, 176352
was made. This proclamation confirmed the existing rules regarding the
acquisition of Aboriginal lands. It fixed the limits of settlement and
directed that purchases of Aboriginal land only occur through public
meetings of the people concerned. As with all other attempts to
constrain individual settlers, its effectiveness was limited. Nevertheless,
the Royal Proclamation codified Aboriginal policy in North America and
became one of the foundational documents of the law of Aboriginal
rights in Canada.53
C. General Comments on these Norms
The colonists came to North America sure of their religious and
cultural superiority, certain that their sovereign had given them
51 Stagg, supra note 23 at 29-237.
52 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1 [hereinafter Royal Proclamation].
53 Robinson, supra note 15 at 122-223 and 235ff; Stagg, supra note 23; and White, supra note 8
at 223-68. For conflict over the acquisition of land in the Great Lakes region after 1763, see White
at 351ff.
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ownership of the land, and convinced that their governments enjoyed
full authority over the inhabitants of the colony, Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal. Confident in the existence of European sovereignty, they
initially acted as though the colonial regime were the sole fount of law
and justice. They quickly found, however, that they could not maintain
their pretensions. Often against their will, they found themselves
making significant compromises to Aboriginal peoples' political
autonomy and material control of the environment. These compromises
were consolidated through the interaction of the parties over time and
eventually became a structure of expectations and practices that
regulated Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations. They became the
principal source of the arguments and procedures used to resolve
intercommunal disputes. They became the substance of a new
normative discourse.
But why normative, and what kind of norriativity? Was this
really a matter of justice, or were all these solutions mere compromises,
departures from law, practical concessions that had nothing to do with
law?
I do not want to embark upon a long argument over the "legal"
or "non-legal" character of the practices described. The reader may
wish to restrict the term "law" to norms affirmed by special institutions,
perhaps to norms more consistent or certain than those we have seen.
At this point, I simply want to speak of the emergence of norms. The
determination of their legal or non-legal character would depend too
much on the imposition of one's prior definitions on a continuing and
evolving process of creation. My objective is not so much to draw the
definitional line, but rather to understand the process as a whole. After
examining the development of the case law on Aboriginal rights, I will
return to address the most important question for our ends-the
relevance of this experience for the recognition of Aboriginal rights in
today's law.
For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the interaction of
Aboriginal peoples and European colonists certainly created stable
practices-practices that dealt with issues near the heart of any legal
system and in a manner that was, in several respects, similar to that of
other undoubtedly legal systems. The norms were used to resolve
disputes between parties, including the most serious crimes against the
person and controversies over the existence and transfer of real property
rights. Even if the practices were not enshrined in formal acts of the
imperial sovereign, they substantially and consistently modified rules
derived from such documents. Sometimes, customary norms were
codified in traditional legal sources, as occurred with Aboriginal title in
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the Royal Proclamation. This codification, by clarifying the existence and
nature of the norms, reduced the risks of misunderstanding of a set of
customary rules that often suffered from the incomprehension and
neglect of colonial officers, especially those recently arrived in the
colonies. It might be tempting to say that the Royal Proclamation
created rules of law where there had only been accommodations of fact,
but we would then be faced with the realization that codification
occurred incrementally over a long period of time. It would be very
difficult to establish the point of transition from fact to law. Moreover,
even without codification, the practices had become standard,
supporting stable expectations and prompting claims that at least had
the appearance of rights 4 Their resilience was demonstrated by the fact
that even when colonial authorities tried to impose their own
preferences, they were often driven back to the customary ways. The
normative character of the practices was evident in their invocation,
often with success, in subsequent disputes, and by the out-cry that
resulted when they were ignored. They did not conform to a positivist
theory of the sources of law. Their content was, at times, very different
from that of our present law. But they nevertheless played a normative
role.
The content of these norms was not the result of an act of will; it
was not the product of some sort of social contract. The colonists and
the Aboriginal peoples did not choose to live in such a community. They
found themselves in it, and they then tried to work out an acceptable
modus vivendi. They did make choices, but they were choices strongly
conditioned by necessity.
Nor were the practices the manifestation of a natural or
universal order. They reflected the specific identities of the parties, their
economic relations, their balance of power, and their style of social
organization. In particular, the norms did not conform to some
transcendental law of contract. Some elements of the parties'
relationship (compensation for murder, the creation of military
alliances, or the activities of missionaries) far exceeded purely economic
considerations (even if the pursuit of economic advantage was an
important motive for collaboration). And these non-economic elements
were far from marginal to the parties' interaction; they were central, an
integral part of a comprehensive alliance. Even the core of the
economic relationship-the exchange of furs-was more than simply a
54 See, for example, the discussion of legislative prohibitions on the purchase of Aboriginal
land in Johnson, supra note 15 at 604, where the court interprets the statutes as being the
codification of a pre-existing policy that already had the force of law.
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
meeting of minds with respect to the transfer of goods. The exchange
often served as the confirmation of a broader relationship of reciprocity,
and thus drew upon the principles of distribution and generosity so
important to indigenous societies. The trading of furs was always
combined with gift-giving, without any clear separation between the
mutual respect symbolized by the gifts and the individual advantage
obtained through the exchange. The distinctive features of the fur trade
produced interesting departures from the contractualist model: the
general acceptance of the unilateral taking of goods by Aboriginal
people (appropriations that the traders considered theft); and the
extreme hostility of some Aboriginal peoples to changes in price.55
Even if they were not reflective of a natural order, the norms did
have a measure of consistency across the various societies and colonies,
for a number of reasons. First, settlement proceeded in stages; traders
and colonists would discover workable approaches and would then use
them in similar situations. Second, on the Aboriginal side, there had
always been transfer of forms and customs among peoples. Long before
the coming of the Europeans, Aboriginal peoples had their own
extensive trade routes. These links had expanded rapidly with the start
of the European trade, even before Europeans themselves penetrated
the interior. Aboriginal peoples consequently possessed their own
procedures for intercommunal diplomacy. The prevalence of Aboriginal
commerce, together with wars or alliances, facilitated the diffusion of
cultural practices among Aboriginal peoples. Finally, the structure of
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations was similar in the different colonies.
In northeastern North America, the modest size and consensual
organization of Aboriginal societies favoured reciprocity, rather than
authoritarian imposition, as the principal means of social coordination.
5 6
The colonists' Aboriginal policies did vary depending on their reliance
on farming or the fur trade, but the presence (to some degree) of both
kinds of economic activity in most colonies meant that there was usually
a gradation in policy, rather than a radical break, from one colony to
another.
55 See R. White's conclusion in "Native Americans and the Environment" in W.R. Swagerty,
ed., Scholars and the Indian Experience: Critical Reviews of Recent Writing in the Social Sciences
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) at 193; White, supra note 8 at 94-141; O.P. Dickason,
The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton:
University of Alberta Press, 1984) at 235-36 [hereinafter Myth of the Savage]; and Natives and
Newcomers, supra note 11 at 184-94. For the institutionalization of theft and Aboriginal resistance
to price changes, see White, supra note 8 at 75-76 and 116-19; and Natives and Newcomers at 188-90.
56 On the importance of reciprocity in relations between Aboriginal groups, see Myth of the
Savage, supra note 55 at 236; and Salisbury, supra note 12.
[VOL. 33 NO. 4
Relations of Force and Relations of Justice
A kind of standardization therefore occurred, even without
conscious coordination by the colonial governments. Sometimes the
governments did try to standardize practices. The instructions of the
Marquis Duquesne de Menneville with respect to murder are an
example of this occurring through informal means0 7 The process that
led to the Royal Proclamation was a clear example of more concerted
consolidation and centralization. Standardization also occurred through
the decisions of colonial courts, decisions that demonstrate the close link
that existed between colonial practice and the emerging common law of
Aboriginal title.
IV. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE COURTS58
The Canadian law of Aboriginal title is directly descended from
three great decisions of John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court in the first third of the nineteenth
century-Johnson, Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, and Worcester.59
These judgments, and the Canadian cases based upon them, refined and
extended principles that had emerged out of the interaction of the
colonists and Aboriginal peoples over the previous two centuries. In so
doing, the courts demonstrated an empirical spirit similar to that
apparent in the colonial practice itself. Starting from that practice, they
sought to identify and enforce those norms that had made peaceful
cooperation possible. They demanded that governments remain faithful
to commitments undertaken with respect to Aboriginal peoples,
especially concerning Aboriginal land. In this way, they formulated a
body of law that was sui generis, derived from experience rather than
sovereign decree, to regulate relations between the societies.
57 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
58 For an insightful discussion of colonial law as it affects Aboriginal peoples, see
"Understanding," supra note 5 at 736ff.
59 Respectively, supra note 15; 8 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) [hereinafter Cherokee Nation]; and
supra note 41. These judgments are the foundation for the principal Canadian decisions: St.
Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. R (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 610, Strong J. dissenting [hereinafter
St. Catherine's Milling]; Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 320-22, 352, and 380-
85 [hereinafter Calder]; Guerin v.R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 377-78 [hereinafter Guerin]; andR. v.
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1103 [hereinafter Sparrow]. For commentary on these decisions,
see J.C. Burke, "The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality" (1969) 21 Stan. L.
Rev. 500; J. Hurley, "Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution and the Marshall Court" (1982-83) 17
RJ.T. 403; and J. Norgren, "Lawyers and the Legal Business of the Cherokee Republic in Courts of
the United States, 1829-1835" (1992) 10 L. & Hist. Rev. 253.
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This process is patent in Marshall C.J.'s judgments. The Chief
Justice derived his principles directly from practice, often in the face of
contrary indications in the more formal sources of imperial law. The
unilateral and presumptuous assertions made by the imperial authorities
during the first years of colonization were subjected to restrictive
interpretation, taking into account the context in which they had been
made and the profound gulf between the early words and later actions.
Marshall C.J. noted, for example, that the rule of international law that
discovery of a territory gave the discoverer exclusive ownership of the
land was designed to regulate competition among the colonial powers.60
He therefore limited its application to the colonizing powers, thereby
preserving Aboriginal title to the land. He mocked broad claims based
on the charters of colonization, stating: "The extravagant and absurd
idea, that the feeble settlements made on the sea-coast, or the
companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by
them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not
enter the mind of any man."61 This did not mean that Aboriginal
peoples retained full independence. He acknowledged that the status of
those peoples had been seriously modified by the assertion of British
sovereignty so that they could not alienate their lands except to that
sovereign and no longer constituted foreign nations.62 He therefore
arrived at a result that upheld neither the claims of the colonizers nor
the sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples in their entirety, but
recognized instead a new structure, made from the interaction of the
two.
Marshall C.J. freely admitted that this structure was based not on
perfect justice or on pre-existing rules of law, but on a relationship of
fact. Regarding the right of the Crown to the underlying title to
Amerindian land, he said: "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of
the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative
opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the
claim which has been successfully asserted. '63 As for the reasons for
protecting Aboriginal land rights, Marshall C.J. did invoke feelings of
humanity, but it is clear that for him the most important motive was
captured in the phrase, "wise policy":
60 lohnson, supra note 15 at 573-74; and Worcester, supra note 41 at 543-46.
61 Worcester, supra note 41 at 544-45.
62 Johnson, supra note 15 at 574; and Cherokee Nation, supra note 59.
63 Johnson, supra note 15 at 588. See also Worcester, supra note 41 at 543.
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The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered, in some respects, as a
dependent, and in some respects as a distinct people, occupying a country claimed by
Great Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies,
required, that means should be adopted for the preservation of peace; and that their
friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property. This was to be
effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites.
64
The hybrid nature of Aboriginal rights was the result of
conditions unique to North America. Marshall C.J. described these
conditions in the simplistic and even racist terms of the period, but he
nevertheless acknowledged the role of both societies in the creation of
the normative order.6 5 Marshall C.J. defined the contours of these
rights by considering the actual conduct of the parties. In Cherokee
Nation, the quasi-independent status of the Aboriginal nations was
founded upon the factual relationship they possessed vis-ti-vis the United
States. In Worcester, the characteristics of Aboriginal title were defined
by what had emerged in practice.
66
Why did fact give rise to law? Marshall C.J. did not expressly
address this issue, but there are, in his reasons, a number of hints
concerning the answer. First, the parties themselves treated the
practices as normative. These practices-and not the unilateral
assertions of the colonial charters-furnished the norms by which the
parties had lived. Marshall C.J. underlined the contrast between the
recognition of Aboriginal title "which is evidenced by our history" and
"the charters granted by the monarch of a distant and distinct region,
parcelling out a territory in possession of others whom he could not
remove and did not attempt to remove." 67 The respect for Aboriginal
title had been fundamental to the establishment of North American
societies; it had become part of their living constitutions. Regarding the
restrictions on the alienation of Aboriginal land, Marshall C.J. said:
However this restriction maybe opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been
settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be
supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.
6 8
Second, these norms were based on a reciprocal interaction, in which
each party received something of value.69 To neglect these norms would
64 Johnson, supra note 15 at 589-91 and 596-97; and Worcester, supra note 41 at 546.
65 Johnson, supra note 15 at 590-91; and Cherokee Nation, supra note 59 at 17.
66 Cherokee Nation, supra note 59 at 16-18; and Worcester, supra note 41 at 546ff. See also
Johnson, supra note 15.
67 Worcester, supra note 41 at 560.
6 8 Johnson, supra note 15 at 591-92.
69 Worcester, supra note 41 at 551ff.
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expose the colonial power to "injury to his fame, and hazard to his
power."70 In the result, Marshall C.J. recognized that a body of norms
had emerged that was sui generis, and he translated them into such novel
juridical concepts as the notion of "domestic dependent nations." 71
A similar approach is evident in the Canadian decisions founded
upon Marshall C.J.'s judgments. Here again, the principles were derived
from practice. 72 Strong J., in his summary of the American authorities in
St Catherine's Milling, observed that colonial usage had ripened into the
rules of colonial law. This usage was based not on benevolence but on
the hard experience "of the great impolicy of the opposite mode of
dealing with the Indians which had been practised by some of the
Provincial Governments of the older colonies and which led to frequent
frontier wars." 73 In Strong J.'s judgment and in the majority judgments
of later cases, documents like the Royal Proclamation are cited not as the
source of Aboriginal title, but rather as evidence" of a relationship
established outside the documents. 74
The Canadian cases have adopted the unique concepts
developed in the American authorities, often shaping them in ways that
are rooted in a distinctively Canadian experience. This is especially true,
for example, of the fiduciary obligation of the Crown. This obligation
springs from reflection upon the principles implicit in the relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples-the same kind of reflection
evident in Marshall C.J.'s elaboration of Aboriginal title.75
All these judgments suggest that the binding character of the
principles stems from an obligation on the part of the non-Aboriginal
sovereign to adhere to the premises on which its powers are based. In
St. Catherine's Milling, for example, Strong J. speaks of "breaking faith"
with the Aboriginal peoples; the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Sparrow emphasizes the importance of maintaining "the honour of the
70 Johnson, supra note 15 at 590.
71 Cherokee Nation, supra note 59 at 17.
72 St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 59 at 608 and 612-16; Calder, supra note 59 at 320-23,
Judson J., and 390-91, Hall J. See also the use of the colonial practice in the interpretation of a
treaty in R. v. Stoui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1037-43 and 1052-56 [hereinafter Siout].
73 St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 59 at 609, 612, and 615-16. These words were cited with
approval by Hall J. in Calder, supra note 59 at 376-79. See also Sioui, supra note 72 at 1053-56.
74 St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 59 at 626; and Calder, supra note 59 at 323, Judson J.
75 Guerin, supra note 59. See the interpretation of the obligation's origin in Sparrow, supra
note 59 at 1108-10; and "Understanding," supra note 5 at 753-56.
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Crown."76 These decisions clearly affirm that the norms of honourable
conduct, once assumed, cannot be cast aside when they no longer serve
the interests of the powerful.77
The origin of these norms in continual reflection on the
intercommunal relationship is also evident in the norms' generality, their
openness. It is the overall character of the relationship that is
protected-the obligations of respect and fidelity-and not a detailed
code of rights and responsibilities. The relationship is thus open to
evolution and adaptation, permitting, for example, government
regulation (on certain conditions) of Aboriginal fisheries.78
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has described the emergence, through practical
reason, of a set of intercommunal norms to govern relations between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in northeastern North America.
These norms were not the product of a straightforward exercise of
sovereign power, but rather a long history of interaction and
experimentation. From a series of ad hoc and pragmatic
accommodations, a structure emerged that the parties themselves
recognized to be normative and that they customarily invoked to resolve
intercommunal conflict.
In large measure, fact made law. At the very least, fact
significantly altered the normative presumptions of the colonists and
colonized alike. It is true that the demographic balance between the
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations, the relative extent of
economic interdependence or conflict, the inability of the First Nations
to expel the newcomers, and the inability of the latter to subjugate the
former all played a role in the genesis of this modus vivendi. But despite
the fact that their relationship was undeniably shaped by power, the
76 Supra note 59 at 1107-08, 1110, and 1114. See also St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 59 at
621. There is a marked resemblance between this language and Postema's argument: see supra note
9 at 1176ff.
77 This conclusion is especially apparent in the discussion of Aboriginal/American relations
during and immediately after the American Revolution in Worcester, supra note 41 at 551. See also
the Canadian reasoning concerning the extinction of Aboriginal rights, for example, in Sparrow,
supra note 59 at 1101.
78 Sparrow, supra note 59 at 1109-10. See also the reasons of Strong J. in St. Catherine's
Milling, supra note 59 at 608, where he recognizes that Aboriginal land rights are not "perhaps
susceptible of any accurate legal definition in exact legal terms."
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parties themselves came to conceive of their relationship in normative
terms.
Why? What drove the parties to this normative turn-to create,
out of fact, norms to regulate conduct? Why ratify the outcome of
unequal power, granting it moral authority? The answer lies in the value
of peace and stability. Even if the resulting order was marked by
inequality and oppression, even if it was not "just" in any absolute sense,
the parties gained real advantage from acknowledging it to be
normative. In the place of the constant and arbitrary threat of force, the
new framework provided moral constraints and stable expectations. The
need to live together, founded as much on the cost of rupture as on
mutual affection, demanded order, and the first source of order was the
normalization of fact.
Fact served this foundational role simply because, at the start, it
was all the parties had in common. They did not share a common moral
tradition. There may have been points of similarity between their
normative beliefs. Their common humanity may well have furnished
some support for normative dialogue. But at the moment of contact, all
these potential resources were expressed through cultural forms that had
developed in complete isolation from each other.79 It was impossible to
embark upon a metaphysical debate aimed at identifying similar beliefs
and common rules by rational deliberation. Nor was it conceivable that
the parties could suddenly agree on transcendant principles applicable to
all. If they had tried to establish intercommunal relations on such a
basis, they would have quickly encountered resistance, for the absolute
principles of one were merely the unjustified presumptions of the other.
A more modest objective was required: a mode of life that would
reduce the number of conflicts and furnish ways of resolving those that
remained. The parties therefore began a process of trial and error,
initially seeking to establish good faith and mutual respect through the
reciprocal exchange of gifts (if they were wise; some explorers began
with intimidation, resulting in relations that were very tense, if not
79 See N. Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1981) at xviii, speaking of the importance of one's cultural tradition to one's
understanding of the world:
Man lives, not directly or nakedly in nature like the animals, but within a mythological
universe, a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from his existential concerns ...
Practically all that we can see of this body of concern is socially conditioned and culturally
inherited. Below the cultural inheritance there must be a common psychological
inheritance, otherwise forms of culture and imagination outside our own traditions would
not be intelligible to us. But I doubt if we can reach this common inheritance directly, by-
passing the distinctive qualities in our specific culture.
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disastrous).8 0  They then developed more elaborate forms and
procedures, gradually creating the normative community described in
this paper. Once they had acquired a common stock of solutions and
experiences, the discussion could proceed, becoming richer and more
complex, in which some solutions were refined, others extended by
analogy, and still others rejected. What began by the normalization of
fact, continued to develop through re-evaluation and criticism.
The Aboriginal peoples' and the colonists' own normative orders
did not disappear in this new community. They retained their specificity;
the new community was limited to intercultural matters. The peoples
therefore combined the maintenance of autonomy with the need for
common standards-standards derived not from their traditions of
justice taken independently, but from a mediation across traditions.
This mediation did not occur merely at the level of the individual case,
but was a mediation of principle, producing a mediated justice.
The resulting norms were neither static nor perfect. During the
period of colonization they did not completely suppress violence, just as
international law today does not eliminate war. The parties'
interpretations of the common norms were often discordant; the
normative terrain remained an arena for struggle. Moreover, the
intercultural normativity continued to evolve under the influence of
ideological changes in each society, the impact of European diseases on
indigenous populations, and the evolution of economic relations
(especially.the decline of the fur trade). Some of these changes,
particularly the pressure on Aboriginal societies as a result of
impoverishment and decimation by disease, severely undermined the
relationship. Nevertheless, after these catastrophes and the disastrous
paternalism that followed, the parties have returned to the initial
structure of their interaction, trying to learn the lessons of the past and
attempting to build on the more promising foundation of the period that
followed first contact, before indigenous societies were undermined.
The historical experience has become the principal horizon in the
attempt to establish justice between peoples.
But given the continual evolution of these norms and their close
connection to the conditions of the colonial period, how can that
experience have created justiciable rights? It may well furnish
8 0 There are many examples in the ethno-historical literature of intimidation (especially at the
beginning of the period), which often led to attacks against the Europeans. See the examples cited
in supra notes 18 and 19; and Salisbury, supra note 12 at 63-66 (four Frenchmen were killed by
Amerindians at Monomoy in 1606, after the former had erected a cross and tried to intimidate the
latter).
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interesting-perhaps even instructive-stories, but does it confer rights?
And if rights do emerge from practice, why can't practice destroy them?
It is true that some aspects of the parties' experience, including
the responses to intercultural crime, lacked the stability (at least in their
detail) that one usually associates with law. Moreover, the relationship
between the societies has changed to such an extent that some responses
would be completely inappropriate today. I am not suggesting that we
simply apply the eighteenth century precedents. Instead, I share the
conception of the judicial role implicit in the judgments of Marshall C.J.
and other great jurists. We are not irrevocably bound by the solutions of
the eighteenth century, just as we are not bound by eighteenth century
doctrines on delictual responsibility. Rather, that experience provides us
with points of departure-with necessary normative presumptions-at
the same time pushing us to refine those presumptions in order to
render them more adequate. 81
If we do adopt the solutions that emerged during the period of
colonization, they will be solutions that have been reinterpreted, adapted
to present circumstances. We will adopt them for reasons different from
those that led to their emergence. We no longer seek to maintain
alliances against a powerful colonial competitor. We no longer want to
secure preferential access to furs. Rather, we have lived with the
consequences of policies that attempted to suppress indigenous cultures.
We have observed the damage that those policies have produced. We
have come to realize that our recent conduct towards Aboriginal peoples
has not been consistent with general principles of our legal tradition,
such as respect for promises, security of property, and the importance of
acquiring rights in a manner that is just and equitable. This realization
prompts us to seek models in the period of our history during which
Aboriginal people and their societies were respected, even if only
because the balance of power lay more in their favour. This process of
moral reflection does not proceed by deduction from fixed premises, but
in a pragmatic and incremental manner. Through the legal techniques
of interpretation and constant adjustment, we turn back towards a
neglected aspect of our normative history.
But does this return to our prior experience fall within the
competence of courts, involving, as it does, so much reconstruction?
Negotiations may indeed be a better means for determining the precise
content of Aboriginal rights. For that reason the courts may choose to
81 The notion of "regret" is also, therefore, an integral part of our moral relation to the past.
For the development of this notion, see Postema, supra note 9 at 1178-80; and "Jurisprudence of
Regret," supra note 5.
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limit their role to the declaration of general principles emerging from
the history of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations, such as the right to a
measure of governmental autonomy or the fiduciary obligation of the
Crown. But at least with respect to those general principles, the courts
cannot avoid the obligation to decide.
All judging presupposes an appreciation of the legitirfiacy and
extent of legal orders. Courts rarely discuss these presumptions, but
nevertheless there are situations in which they profoundly shape the
outcome. For example, if the British Parliament tomorrow repealed the
Canada Act 1982,82 the Canadian courts would find themselves forced to
inquire into the basis of the Canadian legal order. Does that order still
depend on the supremacy of the British Parliament, or does it have its
own independent foundation? The judges could not avoid such
questions on the pretext that the answers lay outside the field of law.
The question of the norms applicable in such a situation is undoubtedly
legal, going to the very identity of the Canadian legal order. In such a
case, the courts could reasonably decide that British law no longer
prevailed in Canada. That decision would be based not on rules
proclaimed by the sovereign (precisely because the question demands
that one determine who is sovereign) but rather on the judges'
interpretation of the present relationship between the Canadian and
British societies.83
Aboriginal rights pose an analogous problem. The courts cannot
avoid the issue by applying the non-Aboriginal law and leaving the
"political" problem of the Aboriginal peoples to the politicians. The
issue is precisely about the extent of the non-Aboriginal legal order and
the possible survival of another order whose origin lies outside the
unilateral actions of a non-Aboriginal sovereign. A decision to consider
the non-Aboriginal law as the sole source of justiciable norms, applicable
without qualification to Aboriginal people, would presuppose an answer
to this fundamental question. If it is true that the constitutional history
of Canada has been marked by the coexistence of different societies, that
those societies have retained their own normativity, and that they have
regulated their mutual relations by a set of intercommunal norms, the
survival of this normativity remains a legal issue, one that must be
resolved in order to determine the scope of non-Aboriginal norms.
The possibility of an intercommunal normativity demands
humility from jurists educated and functioning in an emphatically non-
82 (U.K), 1982, c. 11.
83 For an illuminating discussion, see B. Slattery, "The Independence of Canada" (1983) 5
Supreme Court L.R. 369.
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Aboriginal intellectual milieu. It is much easier to withdraw into limited
and comfortable circles, where the foundations of justice are not directly
challenged. But this approach would have two major disadvantages.
First, if we seek constitutional principles rooted in the experience and
structure of Canada's societies-if we want to avoid the blind
reproduction of principles founded on colonial imposition or the rote
copying of European models-we have to take account of the plurality
of sources of Canadian law, an approach that respects, moreover, the
plurality of peoples that have contributed to making Canada. Second, by
adopting a strategy of withdrawal we would lose one of our principal
sources of moral development. Like many colonists of the seventeenth
century, we are often tempted to believe that the ideal of justice consists
of imposing the order of reason on the disorder of fact. But the history
of Aboriginal rights, like other forms of moral experience, teaches us
that the obstinacy of fact provides eloquent evidence that our
conceptions of justice are limited, provisional-always subject to revision
and reconsideration under the impulsion of la force des choses.
